Artikels word in Engels gepubliseer.
Cyber security
Invoice fraud: verify bank-detail changes before paying
A repeatable verification process for supplier and payroll banking changes, plus what to do when a suspicious payment has already gone through.

A supplier's invoice looks familiar. The amount matches the purchase order. The email appears in an existing conversation. The only change is a short note: “Please use our new bank account.”
That small change can redirect a legitimate payment to a criminal.
Invoice and bank-detail change fraud is not only a finance problem. HR handles employee banking changes. Office managers pay service providers. Executives approve urgent transfers. Anyone involved in requesting, changing or approving a payment needs a dependable verification process.
A request to change payment details is a reason to verify, not a reason to update the record immediately.
Understand what the criminal changes
Business email compromise, often shortened to BEC, uses apparently legitimate business communications to obtain money or information. The FBI's BEC guidance describes lookalike email addresses, targeted phishing and access to genuine billing conversations.
The criminal may not invent an entire transaction. Instead, they interfere with a real one. Common requests include paying an existing invoice into a different account, updating supplier banking details before a payment run, changing a salary account, or settling a confidential executive payment outside the normal workflow.
The amount, invoice number and supplier name may all be correct. What needs verification is the instruction directing the money.
Watch for pressure to bypass the process
A request may explain that the usual account is “under audit”, temporarily unavailable or affected by a banking problem. It may arrive shortly before a deadline, when staff are busy and a callback feels inconvenient. An apparent director might say they are in a meeting and cannot speak.
Other warning signs include a new contact number, an unexpected beneficiary name or resistance to normal verification.
None proves fraud on its own. Equally, their absence does not establish legitimacy. A routine-looking change still needs established checks. Do not allow seniority to become an exception. A genuine executive should follow the same safeguards as everyone else.
Fictional example: the familiar supplier thread
A Johannesburg business receives a cleaning contractor's monthly invoice for R18,400. The email appears in the existing conversation and includes a bank confirmation letter. The sender says the contractor has changed banks and asks for payment that afternoon.
Thandi, the office manager, does not call the number in the new signature. She uses the contractor's previously verified number from the supplier record. The contractor confirms its banking details have not changed. Thandi stops the payment and alerts finance and IT.
The genuine invoice amount and convincing letter did not establish that the new account belonged to the supplier. Independent verification exposed the problem. This is a fictional training example, not a documented customer incident.
A repeatable bank-detail change workflow
Adapt this practical workflow to your organisation's payment policy.
1. Hold the change
Do not update the supplier record or release payment while verification is incomplete. Mark the request as awaiting checks so another colleague does not unknowingly process it. Make the hold visible in the normal workflow rather than keeping a private note in an inbox.
2. Contact an established person independently
Use a number already held in a verified record—not one in the request, attachment or new signature. Ask the authorised contact whether they requested the change. Where your process requires it, have them provide details rather than simply agreeing with information you read aloud.
The FBI recommends verifying payment requests and account changes in person or by calling through independently established contact information.
3. Follow the approved evidence checks
Obtain the documents your process requires through an approved route. A bank letter can support the process, but should not replace independent confirmation: documents can be altered or attached to fraudulent messages. Consider the complete evidence and your organisation's approval rules, not one impressive-looking document.
4. Apply a separate approval
Where policy requires two people, the second approver should review the verification record—not merely approve because the first person already acted. The approval should concern the changed details as well as the legitimate underlying invoice.
5. Record the outcome
Keep an appropriate record of who verified the change, the established channel used, when it happened and who approved the update. Limit access to banking information and retain records under the organisation's rules.
Apply the same discipline to payroll
HR should not change a salary account solely because an email appears to come from the employee. Use the approved payroll-change process and an established identity-verification method.
Do not ask employees to send unnecessary identity documents through ordinary email or informal messaging. For remote staff, provide a clear alternative to an in-person check. An impractical process encourages workarounds.
Employees should know where to submit legitimate changes and how to query an unexpected confirmation. A clear process protects payroll staff and employees alike.
What if the contact cannot be reached?
Do not substitute urgency for verification. Escalate to the designated finance manager or payment owner. Any exception should follow an authorised, documented process with appropriate checks.
A small “test payment” is not proof that an account belongs to the intended recipient. It only demonstrates that money can reach the account. An email reply saying “confirmed” is also weak verification if that mailbox may be compromised.
If payment has already been made
Contact the bank immediately through its established fraud channel and ask about stopping or recalling the transfer. Notify internal finance and incident leads at once. The FBI likewise advises immediate financial-institution contact after suspected BEC.
Preserve messages, invoices, beneficiary details, payment references and verification records. Follow your organisation's process for contacting SAPS and other relevant parties. Recovery is not guaranteed; reporting should not be delayed while staff debate blame. If personal information was exposed, involve the Information Officer too.
Build the pause into everyday work
Put the verification rule into supplier setup, payroll onboarding and approval training. Make clear that staff will be supported for delaying an unverified change. Test whether the trusted contact record is actually usable before the next payment deadline.
AwareStaff's Cyber Security Essentials course reinforces the impersonation and phishing habits behind this process. The strongest habit is not memorising every scam variation. It is refusing to let a convincing message replace an established payment control.
Sources and further reading
- FBI: Business Email Compromise.
- IC3: Cyber Criminals Conduct Business Email Compromise Through Cloud-Based Email Services — a 2020 advisory, used for background on compromised accounts, not current prevalence.
Sources checked on 3 November 2026.
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